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THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF TIF IN THE ST. LOUIS 
METROPOLITAN REGION: A LOOK AT NEIGHBORHOOD 
DISPARITIES 
SARAH L. COFFIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In January 2009, the East-West Gateway Council of Governments 
(EWGCG) issued an interim report assessing the effectiveness and fiscal 
impacts of the use of local development incentives in the St. Louis region.1 In 
that report they concluded that among the massive tax expenditures over the 
past twenty years (approximately $1.3 billion in tax commitment to tax 
increment financing (TIF) projects alone), there had been little real growth 
associated with that public investment over the long term.2 The report went 
further to conclude that the overwhelming majority of that investment focused 
on retail expenditures and that while in the short term, retail development 
generated considerable local revenue, in many places in the long-term the 
regional fiscal benefits were much more questionable.3 As another case in 
point, according to a 2005 St. Louis Metropolitan Forum analysis of the 2002 
Census of Governments’ statistics for the region, 17% of the regional 
municipal tax revenue (23% on the Missouri side and 6% on the Illinois side) 
is generated by sales tax.4 These findings suggested a redistribution of retail 
dollars was occurring across the region as a result of public investment, with 
those municipalities with the capacity to create development incentive projects 
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 1. EAST-WEST GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS 
AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE USE OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES IN THE ST. LOUIS 
REGION iii (Interim Rep. Jan. 2009) [hereinafter INTERIM REP.], available at http://www.ewgate 
way.org/pdffiles/library/regdev/tifrpt-012609.pdf. 
 2. See id. at 18, 36. 
 3. Id. at 36. 
 4. ATLAS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE: THE ST. LOUIS REGION, METRO. FORUM 11, 
15 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.ewgateway.org/pdffiles/library/regdev/LGFAtlas.pdf. 
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doing so at the expense of less fortunate, surrounding communities. Upon 
further reflection, this focused attention on retail sales suggests greater 
potential for socioeconomic vulnerability at the local level as communities are 
forced to depend on an unstable and somewhat volatile economic development 
strategy that varies widely with the broader global economy. 
The 2009 East-West Gateway interim report provided a snapshot global 
picture for how development incentives were impacting the St. Louis 
metropolitan region. Yet questions detailing the usefulness of development 
incentives within the region remained unanswered. For example, was TIF a 
popular economic development tool having its legislatively intended effect on 
local communities? TIF is one tool in particular that garners strong reactions 
on both sides of the development debate. One need only look to the media for 
examples of how polarizing its use has become.5 And the challenge for policy 
makers is not in deciding whether to limit its use but in how to assist 
communities in understanding how to use the tool effectively. This is a key 
finding that the EastWest Gateway report highlighted in 2009–disparities in 
and among communities where the tool was and was not being used.6 
This article reports on a project that builds on the 2009 interim report.7 The 
project was intended to address some of the unanswered questions left over 
from the 2009 report. In particular, what were the descriptive, spatial impacts 
of TIF in St Louis? Specific questions included the following: 
1. Was TIF used in areas characterized by blight? 
2. Did TIF reduce blight over time (both in the immediate area and in the 
surrounding areas)? 
3. Was TIF used differently in areas characterized by different degrees of 
racial or economic disparity? 
4. Did patterns of racial or economic isolation shift after the completion of 
TIF projects?8 
 
 5. See Tim Logan, Northside Plan Draws Heavy Fire at Public Hearing, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Aug. 28, 2013), available at http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/northside-plan-
draws-heavy-fire-at-public-hearing/article_f11ad7bc-3213-5c0e-9c4b-9df728a5916a.html. 
 6. See INTERIM REP., supra note 1, at 33. 
 7. See generally EAST-WEST GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV’TS , AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
EFFECTIVENESS AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE USE OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES IN THE 
ST. LOUIS REGION (Final Rep. Jan. 2011) [hereinafter FINAL REP.], available at http://www.ew 
gateway.org/pdffiles/library/regdev/devincresfinal.pdf (The project was funded by the East-West 
Gateway Council of Governments and involved three universities; Saint Louis University, 
University of Missouri, St. Louis, and Southern Illinois Edwardsville. Each university was 
charged with addressing different aspects of questions generated by the 2009 interim report. The 
university research culminated in a report issued by the East-West Gateway Council of 
Governments.). 
 8. See id. at 33. 
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As a part of this research, a TIF typology was developed for the Missouri 
projects9 that categorized each project according to its use to develop an 
understanding about the differences among the TIF uses, for example 
identifying the numbers of single use retail versus mixed use non-retail 
projects.10 This allowed an examination into whether TIF was being used for 
its intended purposes and if the development tool was leading to desirable 
outcomes. 
This article will be structured in the following way. It will begin with a 
review of the relevant literature that provided a structure for the report that 
guided the research. It will then describe the methodology for the study that 
examined TIF use in St. Louis, offering an overview of how the data was used 
and where it was obtained. A discussion of findings will follow, with an 
examination of the data, its patterns and spatial implications, followed by 
suggestions for further policy research. 
I.  A REVIEW OF THE TIF LITERATURE 
Tax increment financing has been a carefully studied development tool 
over the years. While the impact of TIF on local government has been 
increasing in recent decades, its origins as an economic development tool are 
in the early postwar era. TIF was first implemented in California in 1952 in 
order for cities to avoid the difficulties associated with obtaining electoral 
support for raising the funds required for federal urban renewal matching 
funds.11 TIF use, however, did not become widespread in the United States 
until the 1970s. States were beginning to experiment with local economic 
development programs designed to address the fiscal stresses brought on by the 
economic recession of the 1970s.12 TIF, as a specific development tool, was 
fueled by the tax revolt that swept through the country in the late 1970s. In 
California, TIF popularity rose in reaction to the passage of Proposition 13, 
which set a ceiling on local property taxes.13 Klemanski notes that over half of 
the states that have enacted TIF legislation did so between the years 1974 and 
 
 9. See id. at 41–48. 
 10. Id. at 33. 
 11. See Craig L. Johnson, Tax Increment Debt Finance: An Analysis of the Mainstreaming of 
a Fringe Sector, 19 PUB. BUDGETING AND FIN. 47, 47 (1999); Kenneth A. Kriz, The Effect of Tax 
Increment Finance on Local Governmental Financial Condition, 22 MUN. FIN. J. 41, 41 (2001). 
 12. Rachel Weber & Sara O’Neill-Kohl, The Historical Roots of Tax Increment Financing, 
or How Real Estate Consultants Kept Urban Renewal Alive, 27 ECON. DEV. Q. 193, 193–207 
(2013). 
 13. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in TAX 
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACTS 15, 
17 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001). 
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1979.14 Later, TIF became an increasingly attractive redevelopment technique 
as federal funding for urban renewal projects and other public financing 
opportunities dried up in the late 1970s and 1980s.15 More recently, states have 
passed TIF statutes to finance everything from sports stadia and golf courses to 
shopping malls and mixed-use commercial retail/office projects.16 
While tax increment financing is considered a very effective (and popular) 
economic development tool, public officials often face difficulties in putting it 
to use. A common challenge reviewed in the literature focuses on the TIF 
potential to divert revenue from the more typical investments in what most 
consider the public good (e.g., recreation, public health, affordable housing, 
and education) to what many consider private sector development priorities.17 
This diversion of tax revenues is a key criticism of TIF: as the private 
investments increase the value of the district’s tax base, the new revenues do 
not flow to the municipality or to any of the other “overlapping” jurisdictions 
(i.e., school districts, counties) that share in the property tax base. The new 
revenues are used instead to pay off the debt or to invest in further 
improvements for the district for a period of time that may be as long as thirty 
years.18 Often the jurisdiction with the most to lose or gain from TIF is the 
local school district, because it is typically the most property tax-dependent 
jurisdiction. TIF is structured so a local school district must wait until the end 
of the life of the TIF district to partake in the expected growth in the tax base.19 
The practice in most states is for the TIF district to capture all the incremental 
revenue generated by all the taxing jurisdictions (including schools) within the 
TIF district for use exclusively by the TIF district.20 As a result, the chief 
opposition to TIF comes from school districts. Opposition to TIF can also 
come from property owners within the proposed TIF district because 
increasing property values due to development may price current residents and 
businesses out of the market.21 
Additional critiques call into question the reallocation of existing resources 
for TIF projects. There are many factors beyond local government control, 
 
 14. John S. Klemanski, Using Tax Increment Financing for Urban Redevelopment Projects, 
4 ECON. DEV. Q. 23, 23 (1990). 
 15. Klacik & Nunn, supra note 13, at 18. 
 16. Weber & O’Neill-Kohl, supra note 12, at 203. 
 17. Rachel Weber, Selling City Futures: The Financialization of Urban Redevelopment 
Policy, 86 ECON. GEO. 251, 260 (2010); Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax 
Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 88 
(2010). 
 18. Rachel Weber, Equity and Entrepreneurialism: The Impact of Tax Increment Financing 
on School Finance, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 619, 622–25 (2003). 
 19. See id. at 620–21, 625. 
 20. Id. at 622–23. 
 21. See id. at 640. 
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which have major effects on municipal finances such as the state of the overall 
economy, polices from higher levels of government, and economic 
development policies of neighboring cities and states.22 With the inability to 
control many factors, local governments tend to focus on short-term vision in 
order to keep government running. Local policymakers focus on economic 
development and public services that indirectly affect governments’ fiscal 
health.23 Adopting TIF in order to eradicate blight and increase the tax base 
requires a local government to reallocate existing and already scarce resources 
to the development and management of the TIF program calling into question 
the net benefit of such tools. The underlying purpose of economic development 
is to achieve economic growth in a market or local economy, and the purpose 
behind incentive-based economic development programs like TIF is to correct 
local market failure occurring in the development process.24 It is in the 
implementation of programs like TIF that cause one to ask the challenging 
question: When an already strapped local government needs to redirect limited 
resources, working with limited capacity to implement such programs, what 
are the lingering equity effects? 
A 2003 Brookings report examined TIF use in Missouri, concluding that 
TIF laws created the potential for overuse and abuse.25 Chief among their 
findings was the likelihood for inter-local competition for sales tax receipts.26 
This tilt toward a sales receipts-focused program led to local economic 
development strategies that reinforced existing lower wage jobs and retail 
projects rather than new wealth-producing economic activity to the region.27 
Another primary criticism that continues to be leveled at this strategy stems 
from the Missouri TIF statute’s loose definition of “blight,” which enables 
municipalities to designate many areas as “blighted” that critics contend run 
contrary to the intent of the TIF legislation.28 And scholars continue to make 
this claim. As recently as 2011, Matthew Kokot argued that a more appropriate 
definition of blight was needed to balance the needs of neighborhoods with the 
 
 22. See George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: The Uses and 
Abuses of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAW. 427, 453–56 (2011). 
 23. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 47. 
 24. See Richard F. Dye & David F. Merriman, The Effects of Tax Increment Financing on 
Economic Development, 47 J. URB. ECON. 306, 307 (2000). 
 25. THOMAS LUCE, CTR. ON URB. & METRO. POL’Y, BROOKINGS INST., RECLAIMING THE 
INTENT: TAX INCREMENT FINANCE IN THE KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN 
AREAS, at v (2003). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Julie A. Goshorn, In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment Financing Reform, 77 
WASH. U. L. Q. 919, 919 (1999). 
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demands of developers, calling for legislation to extend beyond the standard ‘if 
not for’ rule found in most state enabling TIF legislation.29 
Many of the original TIF statutes across the United States authorized TIF 
districts for clearing and redevelopment of blighted urban areas.30 Over time, 
however, political pressure by private developers promoted the use of TIF as 
the only acceptable financing tool for general urban redevelopment. Richard 
Briffault demonstrates this argument in his examination of the development 
tool, stating that the political structure of local economies give communities no 
other choice but to use this tool exclusively to compete for developer dollars.31 
One wonders where the structural flaws can be improved, given this increasing 
dependency at the local municipal level. TIF, and especially its eminent 
domain provisions, are used increasingly as a tool of private developers in 
areas absent what many contend is urban blight; a use that critics charge 
benefits private developers at the public’s expense.32 In a St. Louis example, 
one can point to a 2005 TIF project promoted by the city of Richmond Heights, 
known as the Boulevard as a case example.33 In that project an existing 
business corridor across the street from the Galleria was vacated using TIF in 
order to construct the $231.9 million complex of offices, stores, restaurants, 
and apartments.34 According to a St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorial criticizing 
the municipality’s decision to grant TIF funds, “The Galleria is a money 
machine. Nestled near two interstates in one of the poshest residential corners 
of St. Louis, it is arguably the most successful mall in the region.”35 To justify 
the project, the city argued that the existing small businesses no longer fit 
within the emerging “new urbanism” development focus for the area and that 
the businesses needed to be relocated in order to move forward with a plan to 
redress what consultants stated were blight conditions in the area.36 The area 
was declared blighted to allow the developer access to the TIF subsidy, which 
the developer argued was needed in order to go forward with the project.37 
Interestingly, it was the cost to acquire the land that drove project costs so 
 
 29. Matthew J. Kokot, Balancing Blight: Using the Rules Versus Standards Debate to 
Construct a Working Definition of Blight, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 45, 47–48 (2011). 
 30. Michael D. Wyatt, The TIF Smorgasbord: A Survey of State Statutory Provisions for Tax 
Increment Financing, ASSESSMENT DIG. Nov.–Dec. 1990, at 2, 4. 
 31. See Briffault, supra note 17, at 67. 
 32. See Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing and 
Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 171–72 (1998). 
 33. Phil Sutin, Boulevard St. Louis Takes Step Forward, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 
24, 2003, at W1. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Editorial, A Tale of Two TIFs, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 2003, at B6. 
 36. Meeting Minutes, City Council City of Richmond Heights, Missouri (Mar. 3, 2003), 
http://www.richmondheights.org/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/276. 
 37. See Editorial, supra note 35, at B6. 
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high.38 One questions the blight determination in this case when property 
values remained so high. 
Additional evidence from the literature questions the effectiveness of TIF 
over more traditional economic development programs. A study of TIF use in 
the Chicago metropolitan area found that municipalities that adopt TIF grow 
more slowly after adoption than those that do not.39 During the 1980-1984 
period, all municipalities that would later adopt TIF had a mean growth rate 
roughly equal to those municipalities that did not adopt TIF.40 Yet during 
1992-1995, TIF communities grew substantially slower than those 
municipalities that did not adopt TIF.41 The researchers also found that the TIF 
district’s employment and revenue grew while the rest of the community 
remained flat in both categories.42 
The findings suggested that TIF trades off higher growth in the TIF district 
for lower growth elsewhere in the community.43 This decrease in growth 
supported the revenue shifting explanation that jobs and commercial 
establishments are simply moving around a region.44 New jobs and subsequent 
revenue streams were not necessarily created, just redirected from other parts 
of the community.45 Ultimately, the researchers argued that TIF adoption 
represented a real cost for municipal growth rates and impacted future 
economic development.46 Overall, municipal property values escalated in non-
TIF adopting municipalities more quickly than in TIF communities.47 Also, 
using TIF as an economic development policy to stimulate growth only 
resulted in quick fixes.48 Generally, they observed that TIF was used primarily 
in response to the fierce competition for tax base revenue in the region.49 
While the above arguments and others are important critiques, they deal 
mainly with the broader accountability issues (e.g., failure to meet original 
intent of the statute). The debate in Missouri and elsewhere thus far has 
focused on whether TIF legislation is accomplishing its stated objectives and 
whether those objectives have been defined clearly enough to avoid misuse.50 
However, there has been little research to date on the relationship between the 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Dye & Merriman, supra note 24, at 306. 
 40. Id. at 326. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. at 325. 
 43. Id. at 327. 
 44. Id. at 323–24. 
 45. Dye & Merriman, supra note 24, at 324. 
 46. Id. at 324, 327. 
 47. Id. at 326. 
 48. Id. at 310. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Rogers, supra note 32. 
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socio-economic characteristics of municipalities and the use of TIF. Recent 
legislative analysis has examined the effect of TIF redevelopment on low 
income communities, noting that the relative gentrification impacts following a 
project are seldom considered, yet a more detailed study has yet to explore the 
policy implications of TIF within a metropolitan area.51 Thus, the questions of 
inequities across a region relating to the use of TIF and its subsequent 
outcomes have been largely secondary. It is entirely possible that previous TIF 
studies came up with few findings because they assume that all TIF projects 
are alike. A primary aim of the present study was to address this potential 
problem by creating a TIF typology that delineates the variation in TIF 
projects. Admittedly this typology could not combine projects in Missouri and 
Illinois (as is the nature of the St. Louis bi-state region) given that the states’ 
reporting requirements are markedly different. In Missouri, the requirements 
track individual project uses.52 In Illinois, TIF reporting requirements are by 
district only, and therefore specific information about individual project uses 
does not always get reported in a uniform way.53 The analysis is still valid in 
that the typology offers generalizable information across communities and 
neighborhoods, allowing for a closer look at what differences in development 
patterns and outcomes might exist for different types of development projects. 
II.  RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHODS 
This present study is based on previous research that examined the 
distributive effects of TIF on patterns of neighborhood distress in St. Louis 
County in 1980, 1990, and 2000.54 In that work, a blight index was constructed 
to measure the various elements that contribute to neighborhood distress. In the 
analysis, blight served as a proxy for neighborhood decline as measured by the 
quality of residential property and other key demographic indicators. Blight 
was measured in a quantitative fashion, through an index built using a series of 
indicators identified in the literature as being closely associated with 
neighborhood deterioration.55 The index in Adams’ work was borrowed from 
an earlier approach taken by S. Kristine Walker in a study of brownfield 
 
 51. See Kristen Erikson, Protecting Low Income Residents During Tax Increment Financing 
Redevelopment, 36 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 203, 213–14 (2011). 
 52. See MO. DEP’T OF ECON. DEV., INSTRUCTIONS TO LOCAL TIF ANNUAL REPORT, 
http://ded.mo.gov/upload/tif_rptinstructions.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
 53. See JUDY BAAR TOPINKA, ILL. COMPTROLLER, TAX INCREMENT FINANCE REPORTING 
GUIDE (May 2011), available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/departments/local-govern 
ment-division/tif-districts/reporting-guide. 
 54. See generally H. Douglas Adams, Toward Determining Patterns of Residential Blight 
and Blight Mitigation in St. Louis County, Missouri (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. 
Louis University) (on file with Pius Library, St. Louis University). 
 55. Id. at 54-56. 
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mitigation in St. Louis City.56 There she used a similar approach to understand 
the prevalence of blight and its mitigation on the redevelopment potential of 
brownfield properties in urban neighborhoods.57 
III.  DISTRESS INDEX 
In this present study, a methodology similar to Walker and Adams was 
used to create a comparable index for the entire eight-county region for the 
years 1990, 2000, and 2008 using both census data and census estimates. The 
Distress Index58 was based on demographic data for municipalities and census 
block groups from four sources: Summary File 3 in the 1990 and 2000 U.S. 
Censuses, Geolytics’ 1990 census data in 2000 boundaries, and Claritas’ 2008 
Pop Facts estimates.59 The methodology employed here improved on the past 
work by combining multiple data sources that allowed a closer look at 
neighborhood change in constant block group boundaries. The property use 
indicators are: 
 Percent renter-occupied housing units; 
 Percent vacant housing units; and 
 Percent housing units built prior to 1950. 
 
 56. Id. at 54 (citing Kristine S. Walker, The Prevalence of Blight and Brownfield 
Redevelopment in St. Louis (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, St. 
Louis) (on file with University of Missouri, St. Louis library)). 
 57. Walker’s index used six measures related to brownfields and property underutilization. 
Id. The indicators Walker used were: Comprehensive Environmental Remediation Compensation 
Liability Information Systems (CERCLIS) sites, percent vacant land, percent vacant and 
vandalized buildings, percent Land Reutilization Authority (LRA) owned land, percent vacant 
housing units, and number of abandoned gas stations. Id. at 55–56. Since Walker’s study looked 
at environmental mitigation concerns and issues of environment justice, her indicators focused on 
physical attributes that are descriptive of underutilization of properties or indicators of physical 
blight. Id. at 56. Walker used the 2000 census block group as her unit of analysis. Adams, supra 
note 54, at 56 (citing Kristine S. Walker, The Prevalence of Blight and Brownfield 
Redevelopment in St. Louis (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, St. 
Louis) (on file with University of Missouri, St. Louis library)). She standardized each of the six 
measures to create her blight index. Id. 
 58. For this study, the term “Blight Index” replaced “Distress Index,” due to legal weight 
often assigned to the term, “blight” in determining program eligibility. Additionally, the term 
“distress” describes neighborhood health in a broader and more appropriate sense. 
 59. 2008 POP FACTS, NIELSON CLARITAS, INC. (2008) [hereinafter CLARITAS] (Census 
block group estimates purchased January 2009.) (on file with author); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
UNITED STATES CENSUS 2000: SUMMARY FILE 3 (2000) [hereinafter SUMMARY FILE 2000], 
available at http://www.census.gov/census2000/sumfile3.html (on file with author); U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, 1990 CENSUS SUMMARY FILE 3 (1990) [hereinafter SUMMARY FILE 1990], available at 
http://www2.census.gov/census_1990/1990STF3.html (on file with author); Joshua Comenetz, 
GeoLytics’ CensusCDs: Provide Data with Ease, 14 GEOSPATIAL SOLUTIONS, no. 2, Feb. 2004, 
at 46–48. The calculations using this data throughout the article are on file with the author. 
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SES indicators are: 
 Percent households earning less than half of the metro median income;60 
 Percent of population 25+ years with less than a high school education; 
 Percent unemployed; and 
 Percent female headed households. 
The selection of these measures is based on evidence in the literature 
indicating these factors are associated with neighborhood decline. For 
example, levels of home ownership as opposed to a high level of renter 
occupied housing61 has been determined to be predictive of poverty and 
neighborhood decline. Galster noted that higher proportions of renter 
households had increased odds of poverty increase.62 A proportionately higher 
incidence of vacant residential property compared to the average occurrence in 
the region can be interpreted as an adverse measure of neighborhood 
stability.63 The increasing trend of the feminization of poverty in urban 
environs has been noted as another neighborhood stress indicator.64 The age of 
housing stock has been determined to be another measure of declining 
neighborhoods,65 and the Missouri TIF statue, section 99.805, R.S.Mo., 
identifies housing stock aged thirty-five years or more as one of the criteria for 
determining applicability of TIF development efforts.66 
The Distress Index is calculated using a simple z score for every 
municipality and block group based on the regional mean value and standard 
deviation for each indicator. The Distress Index represents the sum of each 
indicator’s z-value, which is then ranked into sets of quartiles above and below 
the mean. Again, this is a departure from Adams and Walker where only 
 
 60. See Todd Swanstrom et al., Measuring Concentrated Poverty: The Federal Standard vs. 
A Relative Standard, 19 HOUS. POL’Y DEB. 295 (2008) (explaining the advantages of using this 
relative measure of poverty). Calculation of federally-defined poverty populations by block group 
would not be possible for 2008, as Claritas does not provide estimates of this variable due to the 
complexity of the standard. 
 61. George C. Galster et al., The Fortunes of Poor Neighborhoods, 39 URB. AFF. REV. 205, 
222 (2003). See generally William M Rohe et al., Home Ownership and Access To Opportunity, 
17 HOUS. STUD. 51 (2002); Neil Smith et al., The “Camden Syndrome” and The Menace of 
Suburban Decline: Residential Disinvestment and its Discontents in Camden County, New Jersey, 
36 URB. AFF. REV. 497, 500 (2001). 
 62. Galster et al., supra note 61. 
 63. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 31–32. 
 64. See generally Linda J. Peake, Toward a Social Geography of the City: Race and 
Dimensions of Urban Poverty in Women’s Lives, 19 J. URB. AFF. 335 (1997). 
 65. Galster et al., supra note 61 at 222–23; Harry L. Margulis, Predicting the Growth and 
Filtering of At-risk Housing: Structure Ageing, Poverty and Redlining, 35 URB. STUD. 1231, 
1231–32 (1998). 
 66. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805 (2000). 
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quartile assignments above zero were ranked. Everything ranking below zero 
held a uniform non-blighted ranking.67 By further describing the levels of non-
distress in the present study, an important dimension is added to understanding 
where and how TIF is being used. Values in the second, third, and fourth 
quartiles above and below zero are said to be approaching extreme, while those 
in the first quartiles on either side of zero are said to be near the regional 
average. 
These data were assigned to TIF projects and districts in different ways for 
each level of the analysis. To analyze municipalities, the Federal Information 
Processing Standard (FIPS) code for each municipality was added to the TIF 
database. The measures were joined to projects and districts based on this 
unique identifier. To analyze change in the immediately surrounding areas, 
block group-level measures were joined to projects where the centroids were 
either within that block group or within an estimated 2.5 minute drive time of 
that block group’s centroid.68 
IV.  TIF PROJECT/DISTRICT DATA 
Information on TIF use all came from a database provided by EWGCG.69 
Due to differences in TIF legislation between Missouri and Illinois, and the 
reporting challenges that EWGCG faced, data collection remained a difficult 
task.70 Examples of state reporting differences included the City of East St. 
Louis and St. Louis City.71 Individual TIF districts could be differentiated in 
Missouri, allowing a more careful analysis of TIF impacts in St. Louis City.72 
However, in East St. Louis, the entire city had been declared a TIF district and 
record keeping regarding specific projects was problematic, making it difficult 
to impossible to connect project spending to neighborhoods.73 While Missouri 
municipalities generally vote to approve TIF on individual projects, 
 
 67. Adams, supra note 54, at 90. 
 68. Drive times were determined using East-West Gateway’s transportation modeling road 
network data to create polygons showing the areas which one could reach within a 2.5 minute 
drive time from each TIF project. Drive times are the best measure for determining proximity 
because they take into account barriers such as rivers, industrial corridors, and sparsely-developed 
areas. By using block group centroids, only block groups are included where the majority of the 
population likely is near the TIF project. Large block groups are sparsely settled and even if they 
are adjacent to a block group containing a TIF project it is unlikely that its population is near 
project. EAST-WEST GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, DEVELOPMENTAL INCENTIVES RESEARCH: 
TIF, CID, TDD, BDD 2012 UPDATE (2012) [hereinafter DATAFILES], available at http://www.ew 
gateway.org/dirr/dirrdata/dirrdata.htm. The calculations using this data throughout the article are 
on file with the author. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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municipalities in Illinois create TIF districts within which many different 
projects can take place.74 Further, even if a TIF district is approved in Illinois, 
often information about the number of projects associated with the district, 
when (or if) they were completed, and what type of project(s) occurred seldom 
gets reported, nor is the information recorded.75 
Information about geographic locations of TIF projects and districts came 
from GIS shapefiles of TIF parcels provided by EWGCG and updated by 
researchers at the Public Policy Research Center at the University of Missouri, 
St. Louis.76 The typology was based on variables included in the EWGCG TIF 
database and research into projects on municipal government websites and 
Lexis Nexis news searches. 
As mentioned earlier, a typology of TIF projects in Missouri was 
constructed, examining them according to patterns of economic and racial 
spread.77 For this aspect of the assessment nine separate categories were 
developed, describing the different types of TIF projects.78 Table 1 below 
describes the nine categories and how they apply. 
  
 
 74. DATAFILES, supra note 68. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. FINAL REP., supra note 7, at 41–45. 
 78. Id. 
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TABLE 179
 
Type of TIF Use 
Hotel-Convention 
 
Primary use focused on large 





TIF is structured as a district and 
funds pay for infrastructure, any use 
included, e.g. Lafayette Square. 
 
Mixed Use - No Residential 
 
Primary use focused on more than 
one use excluding residential, 
primarily retail and office but could 
include industrial and office. 
 
Mixed Use - With Residential 
 
Primary use focused on residential 
space with at least one other use, 
primarily retail but also including 
office. Majority found in St. Louis 
City are condo or loft developments 
with residential units above street-
level retail space. 
 
Single Use – Hotel 
 
Primary use focused on single use 
hotels, which are smaller than 
convention center projects. 
 
Single Use – Industrial 
 
Self explanatory use 
 
Single Use – Office 
 
Self explanatory use 
 
Single Use – Residential 
 
Self explanatory use 
 
Single Use – Retail 
 
Self explanatory use 
 
 
 79. See id. 
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V.  FINDINGS 
While much attention is paid to whether communities using TIF to fund 
economic development projects are getting value for that public investment, 
regional analysis showing socioeconomic impact is rarely discussed. What 
follows is a preliminary assessment of the regional effects of TIF on 
neighborhood distress. This is a preliminary assessment due to the limited data 
available. What is not presented are any causal relationships, merely patterns in 
data that suggest spatial relationships between TIF districts and the residents 
impacted by them. 
Given aforementioned data limitations, the analysis was developed in two 
steps. The first step examined municipal- and block group-level demographics 
to analyze the characteristics of municipalities near the time of the approval of 
their first TIF projects or districts in both Missouri and Illinois. The second 
step examined change over time, considering the areas immediately 
surrounding completed TIF projects given that often the arguments behind 
supporting a TIF project are that one will see improvements in socioeconomic 
outcomes over time at the neighborhood level. 
VI.  MEASURES OF DISTRESS 
This component was examined several ways, categorizing by place, TIF 
project, and block group in order to understand any patterns that might be 
present relative to TIF use over time. Out of eighty-two municipalities that had 
funded either a TIF district or project in the St. Louis region: 
 37% were moderate to very stable at the time of their first TIF; 
 35% were moderate to very distressed at the time of their first TIF; 
 40% showed an overall decrease in neighborhood distress between 1990 
and 2008; and 
 60% showed an overall increase in neighborhood distress between 1990 
and 2008.80 
These patterns reflect the earlier patterns of economic isolation, that 
initially, wealthier communities were using TIF pre-emptively as a means to 
ward off potential blight.81 Their intent, however, stands in stark contrast to the 
outcome for 60% of the municipalities that showed an overall increase in 
 
 80. Out of 331 TIF projects and districts found in the database provided by EWGCG, there 
are 303 with sufficient information for this portion of the study. Only those municipalities with 
TIF projects that have confirmed start dates and geographic locations will be counted. It is 
possible that this may include projects that never started or districts that have yet to see new 
development projects. This portion of the analysis serves to describe the situations of 
municipalities who have made the decision to use TIF. CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, 
supra note 68; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 81. CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
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neighborhood distress between 1990 and 2008.82 One must take care not to 
correlate a causal relationship between TIF and distress in this case as there are 
numerous extenuating circumstances that have not been factored into the 
analysis (e.g. the burgeoning foreclosure crisis and growing economic 
recession). Yet, one can certainly question the arguments made for TIF use in 
more affluent areas when communities in the region are struggling for 
dwindling revenue sources. 
For all 303 TIF projects from 1985 to 2006: 
 18% were approved by municipalities characterized by moderate to very 
high stability relative to neighborhood distress; 
 66% were approved by municipalities characterized by moderate to very 
high neighborhood distress; 
 22% of the TIF projects were approved by municipalities that showed an 
overall decrease in neighborhood distress between 1990 and 2008; and 
 78% of the TIF projects were approved by municipalities that showed an 
overall increase in neighborhood distress between 1990 and 2008.83 
Again, while one can see that more TIF projects are locating in more 
distressed areas, in the aggregate, one notices little to no positive 
improvement.84 In fact there is an increase in distress over time.85 Yet, as noted 
previously, there are most likely intervening economic forces at play that are 
creating this increase, and TIF projects alone are not the cause of the increase. 
This finding suggests that municipalities lack adequate economic development 
resources to address neighborhood distress and that TIF has become the tool of 
choice for most communities in the St. Louis metropolitan area. 
To examine patterns of TIF use at the micro level, at the time a TIF project 
or district was approved, the block group in which it was located had the 
following characteristics: 
 26.26% of the block groups had low to very low distress compared to 
the regional mean; 
 28.96% of the block groups were near the regional mean relative to 
neighborhood distress; and 
 44.78% of the block groups had moderate to very high distress 
compared to the regional mean.86 
Again, one notices that 55% of the block groups were either at the regional 
mean or below in neighborhood distress at the time a TIF project was 
 
 82. CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 83. CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 84. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 85. CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 86. CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
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approved.87 This pattern once again supports the earlier claim that wealthier 
communities are looking to preempt blight. 
The TIF typology showing level of distress characterizes the patterns of 
neighborhood distress according to our distress index. In Table 1 the different 
TIF projects are described according to levels of distress by municipality. In 
the aggregate, considering all Missouri projects in the St. Louis Metropolitan 
region, mixed use projects with residential elements are found predominantly 
(53 projects, or 90%) in municipalities characterized as moderately to very 
distressed.88 Of the single use retail projects, most (24 projects, or 45%) are 
similarly found in moderate to very distressed municipalities with 16 projects 
(30%) in municipalities considered moderately to very stable.89 When data 
from the City of St. Louis is excluded, single use retail projects are fairly 
evenly divided across the three classifications of distress (moderately to highly 
stable—38%, average—31%, moderately to highly distressed—31%) with 
slightly more found in the moderately to very stable communities.90 Of the 
mixed use no residential projects, most (15 projects or 50%) are located in 
moderately to very stable municipalities.91 
Likewise, at the block group level shown in Table 2, the predominant 
number of mixed use residential projects (50 projects, or 78%) are found in 
block groups that have moderate to high levels of distress.92 Single use retail 
projects (18 projects, or 38%) are likewise found primarily in block groups that 
are moderately or very stable.93 Additionally, more mixed use no residential 
TIF projects (15 projects, or 37%) are found in moderately to very stable block 
groups and average block groups (16 projects, or 39%) than in moderately to 
very distressed block groups (10 projects, or 24%).94 Again, the patterns of TIF 
use suggest that in average to very stable neighborhoods the typical TIF project 
is either a single use retail or mixed use retail with no residential component.95 
 
 87. CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 88. CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 89. CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra note 
59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 90. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. Sixteen were found in 
the moderately to very stable communities. Id. 
 91. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 92. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 93. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 94. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 95. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
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Alternatively, in moderately to severely distressed communities, the typical 
TIF project is either mixed use with some sort of residential component or is a 
single use residential project.96 
These findings suggest that, like the patterns of economic and racial 
isolation, there appears to be a similar relationship between the types of TIF 
projects and level of municipal or neighborhood distress.97 The more distressed 
municipalities do appear to focus more of their TIF efforts on projects that 
promote residential uses, yet they also focus considerable attention on single 
use retail.98 The neighborhood effects of TIF projects suggest that there is little 
relationship between the TIF location decisions of municipalities and 
neighborhood improvement as measured by our distress index. When 
considered in addition to the efforts of stable communities to emphasize retail, 
either through single use or as a part of a mixed use project, this finding 
reinforces the earlier East-West Gateway finding from the interim report that 
all communities around the region tend to depend on retail sales as a primary 
economic development strategy. What the finding reveals is the potential 
instability among municipalities within the region and within municipalities 
that will be further supported by such an economic development strategy. 
  
 
 96. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 97. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 98. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
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TABLE 299 
 
TIF Typology by Level of Distress in the Municipality 





Average Moderately to 
very distressed 
 Total -2 to -4  -1 to 1  2 to 4  
Hotel-
Convention 1 0 0% 1 1 0 0% 
Infrastructure 3 0 33.33% 0 0% 2 66.67% 
Mixed Use – 
No 
Residential 40 15 37.50% 7 17.50% 18 45% 
Mixed Use – 
With 
Residential 59 2 3.39% 4 6.78% 53 89.83% 
Single Use – 
Hotel 8 1 12.50% 0 0% 7 87.50% 
Single Use – 
Industrial 6 1 16.67% 0 0% 5 83.33% 
Single Use – 
Office 9 1 11.11% 0 0% 8 88.89% 
Single Use – 
Residential 28 0 0% 0 0.00% 28 100% 
Single Use – 
Retail 53 16 30.19% 13 24.53% 24 45.28% 
        
Excluding 
St. Louis  




 Total -2 to -4  -1 to 1  2 to 4  
Hotel-
Convention 1 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 
Infrastructure 1 1 100% 0 0% 0 0% 
Mixed Use – 
No 
Residential 30 15 50% 7 23.33% 8 26.67% 
Mixed Use – 
With 
Residential 9 2 22.22% 4 44.44% 3 33.33% 
Single Use – 
Hotel 3 1 33.33% 0 0% 2 66.67% 
 
 99. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
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Single Use – 
Industrial 5 1 20% 0 0% 4 80% 
Single Use – 
Office 5 1 20% 0 0% 4 80% 
Single Use – 
Residential 2 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 
Single Use – 
Retail 42 16 38.10% 13 30.95% 13 30.95% 
*Reflects the time that the project was approved    
**Of 231 Missouri TIFs in the database given to us by EWG, 207 had enough 
information to be put into a typology 
 
TIF Typology by Block Group Distress 
Type of TIF*  




 Total -2 to -4  -1 to 1  2 to 4  
Hotel-
Convention 1 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 
Infrastructure 6 0 0.00% 4 66.67% 2 33.33% 
Mixed Use - 
No 
Residential 41 15 36.59% 16 39.02% 10 24.39% 
Mixed Use - 
With 
Residential 64 5 7.81% 9 14.06% 50 78.13% 
Single Use – 
Hotel 8 1 12.50% 3 37.50% 4 50.00% 
Single Use – 
Industrial 7 2 28.57% 4 57.14% 1 14.29% 
Single Use – 
Office 9 1 11.11% 1 11.11% 7 77.78% 
Single Use – 
Residential 28 1 3.57% 5 17.86% 22 78.57% 
Single Use – 
Retail 47 18 38.30% 16 34.04% 13 27.66% 
*Reflects the time that the project was approved 
 
VII.  CHANGE OVER TIME 
In order to understand the relationship between TIF projects and change in 
racial and economic isolation and distress in the immediate project area over 
time, block groups that either contained or had its centroid located within a 2.5 
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minute drive time of at least one completed TIF project were examined.100 
Again, due to the nature of TIF legislation in Illinois whereby a TIF district can 
contain many projects and thus possibly never be “completed,”101 only projects 
in Missouri known to be at least partially completed were considered.102 
Looking at completed Missouri projects initiated between 1985 and 1994 with 
change from 1990-2008 and projects initiated between 1995 and 2004 with 
2000-2008 change103 allows completed projects time to become established 
and thereby increases the likelihood that a project is having an effect on its 
surroundings. 
The findings shown in Table 3 below show that the areas immediately 
surrounding TIF projects have experienced varying levels of change.104 At the 
municipal level there appears to be a leveling out of the numbers of projects 
located in municipalities relative to the proportion of white population 1990-
2008, yet a moderate to very large increase (28 or 49%) in relative proportion 
of poor.105 The data would indicate that just as the presence of distress or racial 
and economic isolation appears to have little bearing on the decision to use 
TIF, the use of TIF does not seem to be coincident with areas characterized by 
reductions in distress or isolation. In fact, TIF projects initiated between 1985 
and 1994 are three times as likely to be surrounded by neighborhoods 
experiencing an increase in distress between 1990 and 2008 than a decrease.106 
Interestingly, more than twenty block groups near projects started between 
1995 and 2004 saw distress decrease than increase.107 This could be due to 
projects initiating later being located in already-improving areas or being of a 
type more likely to have contributed to reductions in blight. 
There are myriad factors influencing neighborhood change that make it 
difficult to say anything conclusive about the relationship between TIF and 
 
 100. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 101. Bellville, Illinois stands as another illustration of this stark contrast. Like East St. Louis, 
almost the entire municipality has been declared a TIF district yet projects have yet to be 
determined. In Missouri, TIF districts are not established until projects are proposed allowing for 
better analysis of project impacts. DATAFILES, supra note 68. 
 102. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 103. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 104. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 105. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 106. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
 107. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF TIF IN ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN REGION 77 
neighborhood change, though one can be certain that TIF use does not 
guarantee positive change. This is an area especially deserving of more in-
depth analysis. A more complete set of data for TIF projects and the creation of 




Change in Block Groups Near Completed TIF Projects108 
 
Block groups near completed TIF projects begun 1985-1984 
Change in relative 
proportion White, 1990- 
2008 
moderate to very large decrease 23 40.35% 
near regional average 12 21.05% 
moderate to very large increase 22 38.60% 
Change in relative 
proportion poor, 1990-2008 
moderate to very large decrease 14 24.56% 
near regional average 15 26.32% 
moderate to very large increase 28 49.12% 
Change in level of distress, 
1990-2008 
moderate to very large decrease 11 19.30% 
near regional average 13 22.81% 
moderate to very large increase 33 57.89% 
     
Block groups near completed TIF projects begun 1995-2004 
Change in relative 
proportion White, 2000-
2008 
moderate to very large decrease 71 32.42% 
near regional average 55 25.11% 
moderate to very large increase 93 42.47% 
Change in relative 
proportion poor, 2000-2008 
moderate to very large decrease 84 38.36% 
near regional average 47 21.46% 
moderate to very large increase 88 40.18% 
Change in level of distress, 
2000-2008 
moderate to very large decrease 102 46.58% 
near regional average 38 17.35% 
moderate to very large increase 79 36.07% 
 
VIII.  IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH 
The primary implication brought about by this research is that the type of 
TIF matters. There is a wide difference in the levels of municipal and 
neighborhood distress relative to the various types of TIF projects. The 
following patterns are clear: 
 
 108. See CLARITAS, supra note 59; DATAFILES, supra note 68; SUMMARY FILE 2000, supra 
note 59; SUMMARY FILE 1990, supra note 59; Comenetz, supra note 59. 
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 At the municipal level, wealthier communities initially use TIF as a tool 
to preempt distress or creeping blight, yet over time there appears to be 
an evening out in the use of TIF across municipalities. This evening out 
of TIF use is not necessarily a negative alone as it can support the 
development of added infrastructure capacity for communities in need of 
such development. The caution comes when increased TIF use does not 
yield an overall reduction in neighborhood distress. Is the initial expense 
in project development accounted for by an overall improvement in 
community economic circumstances? An essential question that is 
difficult to measure. 
 In Missouri, municipalities use TIF differently. In the city of St. Louis 
the focus is on residential projects while in the outlying region the focus 
is on retail (primarily single use). This focus can exacerbate an already 
protracted jobs housing mismatch in the region as the service sector jobs 
continue to locate further out in the region away from the more 
affordable (primarily rental) housing located closer in, incidentally 
located primarily in the city of St. Louis. More importantly, this finding 
indicates that the city of St. Louis is not competing with the surrounding 
municipalities in Missouri for TIF projects and that there is an 
opportunity for regional cooperation. The jobs housing challenge can 
spur that opportunity through regional TIF projects. 
 At the municipal level it does appear that the city of St. Louis uses TIF 
more appropriately according to its intended use. Generally, most if not 
all TIF projects are located in areas that at the start of the project were 
characterized as moderately to severely distressed. And generally, most 
of these areas have noted a general improvement. 
To revisit the original questions posed by the research: 
1. Were incentives used differently in areas characterized by different 
degrees of neighborhood distress? 
2. Did patterns of neighborhood distress shift after the completion of 
incentive projects? 
3. Were tax incentives used in areas characterized by neighborhood 
distress? 
4. Did the use of incentives reduce neighborhood distress over time (both 
in the immediate area and in the surrounding areas)? 
These findings demonstrate that incentives appear to have been used 
differently according to degree of neighborhood distress, that these patterns 
appear to shift after completion of incentive projects, and that TIF was used in 
areas characterized by neighborhood distress. The data does not provide an 
adequate answer to the fourth question. A full econometric analysis and 
additional data is required to understand the full relationship between the use 
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of tax incentive programs such as TIF and neighborhood distress. This 
research, while analytical in the way that it describes the patterns of racial and 
economic disparities and the levels of neighborhood distress across the region 
relative to TIF use is still primarily descriptive in nature. This research as 
proposed and presented does not analyze the extent of the patterns in 
relationships. To develop that level of understanding would require a much 
larger project and data set. Attempts to analyze what was identified as 
emerging relationships only led to the conclusion that insufficient data was 
limiting a more detailed analysis. Any model developed was simply not robust 
enough to report any findings nor were there any significant variables. This 
result concurs with a major finding of the 2009 interim East-West Gateway’s 
2009 report; proper oversight of this issue will require better reporting and data 
collection mechanisms.109 
TIF is not a magic bullet nor is it a smoking gun. As presently 
implemented, it will do little on its own to solve a community’s long-term 
economic development challenges but does not appear to be creating another 
great socioeconomic divide. It is a useful tool, when used properly, and has the 
ability to stimulate community reinvestment and revitalization. The challenge 
for communities lies in their ability to develop and use it and not let developers 
take control. The following are a set of basic recommendations that 
communities might consider moving forward: 
 Any TIF program needs to be part of a broader economic development 
plan that focuses on a wider range of employment sectors. A sound 
economic development plan should not focus on retail attraction. 
 Communities need to develop long-range capital improvement programs 
that detail infrastructure spending needs that TIF projects would then 
draw from as needed. 
 Communities need to consider their local capacity to incorporate 
different economic development tools into their local planning efforts. If 
capacity is limited, partnerships are needed to address these limitations. 
The broader message points to a need for a consistent approach to 
economic development that takes regional implications into account. Absent 
any meaningful statewide approaches to economic development that solve the 
challenges facing local communities, regional cooperation is needed to assist 
local communities in forming comprehensive economic development strategies 




 109. INTERIM REP., supra note 1, at 35. 
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